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Abstract
We introduce a principle of local collection for compositional truth
predicates and show that it is conservative over the classically compo-
sitional theory of truth in the arithmetical setting. This axiom states
that upon restriction to formulae of any syntactic complexity, the re-
sulting predicate satisfies full collection. In particular, arguments us-
ing collection for the truth predicate applied to sentences occurring in
any given (code of a) proof do not suffice to show that the conclusion
of that proof is true, in stark contrast to the case of induction scheme.
We analyse various further results concerning end-extensions of
models of compositional truth and collection scheme for the composi-
tional truth predicate.
1 Introduction
The area of axiomatic truth theories investigates extensions of foundational
theories, such as PeanoArithmetic (PA)with an additional predicateT which
is intended to denote the set of (codes of) true sentences.
One of the canonical examples of these theories is CT− (Compositional
Truth). It is a theory of truth over PAwhose axioms state that the predicate
T satisfies Tarski’s compositional conditions for arithmetical sentences. For
instance, a disjunction of two sentences is true if either of the disjuncts is.
However, we do not assume that the truth predicate satisfies any induction
whatsoever. All purely arithmetical formulae satisfy the induction scheme
because CT− by definition contains the whole PA.
It is a very simple and classical fact that CT− with the full induction,
called CT, is not conservative over PA. By induction on the length of proofs,
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we can show that whatever is provable in PA is true and thus show the con-
sistency of arithmetic. By a theorem of Kotlarski, Krajewski, and Lachlan,
CT− itself is conservative over PA. In fact, not much induction is needed
to yield non-conservativeness. It has been shown in [21], Theorem 13, that
already CT− with induction for ∆0-formulae proves new arithmetical sen-
tences.
Richard Kaye asked whether the conservativity result remains true if
CT− is enriched with full scheme of collection for the sentences containing
the truth predicate.1 It is known that in presence of ∆0 induction the full
schemes of collection and induction are equivalent. However, without the
access to this small amount of induction, collection seems to be a very weak
principle. If we add the full collection scheme to PA− (the theory of the
positive part of a discretely ordered semiring), then this extension is Π1-
conservative over PA−.2 One could hope for an analogous result for the
compositional truth predicate. Unfortunately, the methods used by Kaye
cannot be implemented directly in the setting of the truth predicate where
the conservativity of collection appears to be a much harder problem. In
particular, as shown by Smith [22] there are countable models M |= CT−
with no proper end-extensions and Kaye’s argument rests on the fact that
every model of PA− can be properly end-extended.
In this paper, we provide a partial answer to the question of Kaye. We
introduce a principle of local collection. It states that if we restrict our com-
positional truth predicate to sentences of any syntactic depth c, the resulting
truncated predicate satisfies full collection. We show that the principle of
local collection for the compositional truth predicate is conservative over
PA.
Already this result shows that there is no full analogy between collec-
tion and induction in the setting of truth theories. One could introduce a
similar scheme of local induction saying that the truth predicate truncated
to sentences of any fixed syntactic depth c satisfies full induction. We could
readily check that this weaker form of induction is enough to show that
there are no proofs of contradiction in PA, since any given proof d involves
only formulae of some bounded syntactic depth c, so we can check by in-
duction that all formulae in d are true. This shows that local induction is
not conservative over PA, in contrast to local collection.
1The question was posed on a session of Midlands Logic Seminar, see [12].
2To our best knowledge, this result first appeared as Exercise 7.7 in [11].
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some basic definitions and background results.
2.1 Arithmetic and coding
This paper deals with extensions of Peano Arithmetic (PA). This is a the-
ory in the language LPA = {0, S,+,×} consisting of finitely many basic
axioms of Robinson’s Arithmetic Q which essentially say how + and × can
be defined inductively in terms of the successor function, and the induction
scheme.
Full induction scheme is equivalent to induction for ∆0–formulae to-
gether with full collection scheme, Coll. The latter consists of all formulae
of the following form (where we allow φ(x, y) to containmore free variables
than just x, y):
∀x < a∃y φ(x, y)→ ∃b∀x < a∃y < b φ(x, y).
Intuitively, collection scheme expresses that any function with a bounded
domain has bounded range. This is clearly true in the natural numbers,
since bounded segments of N are finite and hence the image of any such
set is also finite. Induction for ∆0-formulae is crucial for the equivalence
between induction and collection as shown by Kaye.3
Theorem 1 (Kaye). PA− with full collection scheme (but no induction) is conser-
vative for Π1-formulae over PA
−.
Peano arithmetic, and its much weaker fragments are capable of rep-
resenting syntactic notions. Below, we list formulae representing syntactic
notions which we will use throughout the paper.
Definition 2. • TermLPA(x) states that x is (a code of) an arithmetical
term.
• TermSeq
LPA
(x) states that x is (a code of) a sequence of arithmetical
terms.
• ClTermLPA(x) states that x is (a code of) a closed arithmetical term.
• ClTermSeq
LPA
(x) states that x is (a code of) a sequence of closed arith-
metical terms.
3As we already indicated, this appears as Exercise 7.7 in [11].
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• Var(x) states that x is (a code of) a first-order variable.
• y = FV(x) states that y is the set of free variables of x (which is either
a term or a formula in the language of arithmetic).
• FormLPA(x) states that x is (a code of) an arithmetical formula.
• Form≤1
LPA
(x) states that x is (a code of) an arithmetical formula with at
most one free variable.
• SentLPA(x) states that x is (a code of) an arithmetical sentence.
• y = x is a binary formula which states that y is (a code of) a numeral
denoting the number x.
• y = x◦ states that x is a closed arithmetical term and y is its value. For
instance (N, S,+,×) |= (pS(0) + S(S(0))q)◦ = 3.
• Asn(α, x) states that α is an assignment for x, i.e., a finite function
whose domain contains all free variables of s, where x is either a for-
mula or a term. Wewill useAsn(x) to denote the set of assignments of
x and write α ∈ Asn(x) instead of Asn(α, x). If α is an assignment for
a formula φ, then by φ[α], we mean a sentence in which α(v) has been
substituted for v, for every v free variable of φ. If α is an assignment
for a term t, then tα denotes the value of t under this assignment.
• β ∼v αmeans that β andα are assignments, thedomain ofβ is dom(α)∪
{v} (which is possibly the same as dom(α)), and the values of β are
the same as that of α, possibly except for β(v).
We will use some conventions to improve readability of the paper. We
will write provably functional formulae as if they were function symbols
(which we already started doing above). For instance, we will use the ex-
pression x like a term. In particular, we will typically be suppressing for-
mulae describing syntactic operations and simply write the results of these
operations. For instance, if φ and ψ are codes of sentences, then T (φ∧ ψ) is
an abbreviation for "For all z, if z is the conjunction of φ and ψ, then T (z)."
Wewill sometimes confuse formulaewith sets definedwith these formulae,
e.g., writing x ∈ FormLPA instead of FormLPA(x).
The notion of syntactic depth plays an important role in this paper.
Definition 3. Let φ be a formula. By syntactic depth of φ, we mean the
maximal depth of nesting of connectives and quantifiers in φ. We will de-
note this by dp(φ). By dp(x), we will also mean an arithmetical formula
representing this function.
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2.2 Models of arithmetic
In this paper, wewill make extensive use ofmodel-theoretic techniques. All
relevant model-theoretic background may be found in [11]. Let us discuss
some results of particular importance.
Definition 4. Let M be any model over a finite language. A set p of for-
mulae is a type if at most one free variable v and finitely many parame-
tres a1, . . . , an occur in formulae contained in p, and for every finite subset
φ1(v), . . . , φn(v) there is an element a0 from M such that M |= φi(a0) for
all i ≤ n. The type is realised if there is an element a ∈ M which satisfies
all formulae in p. We say that p is recursive (or computable) if the set of the
Gödel codes of formulae from p is computable. We say thatM is recursively
saturated if any recursive type overM is realised inM .4
Recursive saturation is of crucial importance due to the following theo-
rem:
Theorem 5 (Barwise–Schlipf–Ressayre). If M is a countable recursively satu-
rated model of Th ⊃ PA and Th′ is a computable theory consistent with the ele-
mentary diagram ofM , thenM can be expanded to a model of Th′.
Moreover, one can prove that there is always an expansion ofM satisfy-
ing Th′ which is once again recursively saturated and thus also satisfies the
assumptions of the above theorem. This property of countable recursively
saturated models of PA is called chronic resplendence. Another important
property of recursively saturatedmodels is that they can be relatively easily
classified.
Definition 6. Let M |= PA. By the standard system of M , we mean the
family ofX ⊆ N such thatX = A∩N, whereA is definable with parametres
inM . (Here and everywhere hereafter in the article, we identify the initial
segment in a model of PA isomorphic with natural numbers with the N
itself.)
Theorem 7 (Paris–Friedman). Suppose that M,N |= PA are countable and re-
cursively saturated. Then M ≃ N iff they satisfy the same sentences and have
exactly the same standard systems.
4In the name "recursively saturated," there is admittedly slight tension with the current
naming conventions where "computable" is the preferred expression, but "computably sat-
urated" sounds extremely awkward.
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The same result holds if we replace PA with any other theory in count-
able language containing PA and satisfying full induction for the expanded
language. Another theorem of crucial importance is:
Theorem 8 (MacDowell–Specker). LetM be a model over a countable language
containing the language of arithmetic and suppose that it satisfies full induction
scheme for that language. Then there exists an elementary extension N ≻M such
thatM andN have the same cardinality and for every a ∈ N \M and every b ∈M ,
N |= a > b.
In fact, if we restrict ourselves to countable models, it is enough to as-
sume that the model satisfies collection. This was proved in [13], Theorem
28. For a general overview of model theory of collection scheme, see [5]
(where this result occurs as a part of Theorem 1.2 in a more general context
of models with a linear order).
Theorem 9 (Keisler). LetM be a countable model over a countable language con-
taining the language of arithmetic. Suppose thatM satisfies full collection scheme
for that language. Then there exists an elementary extension N ≻ M such that
M and N have the same cardinality and for every a ∈ N \M and every b ∈ M ,
N |= a > b.
If N is an extension of M such that every new element in N is greater
than all elements in M , then N is called an end-extension of M . If N is
an end-extension of M , this is denoted by M ⊂e N or M ≺e N if it is, in
addition, elementary. In effect,MacDowell–Specker theorem states that any
theory in a countable language which extends PA and proves full induction
scheme for its language has a proper elementary end-extension of the same
cardinality.
By taking an arbitrary countablemodelM of PA, taking elementary end-
extensions, and taking unions in the limit steps, we can construct a model
M ′ ≻e M which has cardinality ℵ1, but whose all initial segments are count-
able. Such models are called ω1-like models. In a similar manner, we can
define κ-like models for an arbitrary cardinal κ. Note that if M is a κ-like
model for a regular κ, then it must have cofinality κwhichmeans that every
subset A ⊂M of cardinality less than κ is bounded.
An easy argument shows that if M ⊂e N |= PA are nonstandard, then
M andN have exactly the same standard systems. In particular, ifM e N
are countable and recursively saturated, then by Paris–Friedman Theorem
(Theorem 7),M ≃ N . Moreover, this also holds ifM,N are models of some
countable theory extending PA which has full induction.
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2.3 Truth
This paper deals with compositional truth theories. Let us now introduce
some of them. A systematic treatment can be found in [10]. See also [3],
where the reader can find more information on arithmetic strength of clas-
sical compositional truth theories. We will not begin with the most canon-
ical example called CT− in which the truth predicate T is compositional
for arithmetical formulae, but rather with its generalisation which plays a
crucial technical role in our paper.
Definition 10. By CT−↾X, we mean a theory in the language of second-
order arithmetic containing arithmetical symbols ofLPA, a unary predicate
T and the membership relation x ∈ X between first-order elements and
sets. To the axioms of PA, we add the following formulae containing a free
second-order variable X:
1. ∀x T (x)→ x ∈ SentLPA ∧ dp(x) ∈ X
2. ∀s, t ∈ ClTermLPA T (s = t) ≡ (s
◦ = t◦).
3. ∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(¬φ) ∈ X → T¬φ ≡ ¬Tφ
)
.
4. ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ ∨ ψ) ∈ X → T (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ Tφ ∨ Tψ
)
.
5. ∀φ ∈ Form≤1
LPA
(
dp(∃vφ) ∈ X ∧ FV(φ) ⊆ {v} → T∃vφ ≡ ∃xTφ[x/v]
)
.
6. ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeq
LPA
∀φ ∈ FormPA
(
s¯◦ = t¯◦ → Tφ(t¯) ≡ Tφ(s¯)
)
.
Hence, CT−↾X states that T is a compositional truth predicatewhich be-
haveswell on formulaewhose syntactic depth is inX. Moreover, by condition
1. no other formulae arewithin the range of T . Formally, models for CT−↾X
are models for the language LPA ∪{T}with an extra assignment forX. We
often employ standardmodel-theoretic conventions and write the interpre-
tation of X in place of the variable X, for example (M,T ) |= CT−↾M . In
practice, we shall also treat X as an additional predicate and write models
for CT−↾X in the form (M,T,X). We will also be writing (M,T ) |= CT−↾X
for X ⊂M with the obvious meaning. We will essentially use the notation
CT−↾X in one context: when X is a nonstandard initial segment (possibly
with the largest element).
By CT↾X, we mean CT−↾X along with the full induction scheme for the
extended language (i.e. formulae which may use the predicate T and the
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free variableX). ByCT−wemean a theory of an unrestricted compositional
truth predicate (i.e., we do not restrict axioms of CT−↾X to formulae from
the setX). By CT we mean CT− with full induction.
In our proof, wewill need to impose anunpleasantly technical regularity
condition on the truth predicates. Essentially, we want to consider truth
predicates which only see syntactic trees of considered formulae and the
values of terms which we plug in rather than specific terms and specific
variables over which we quantify.
First, we introduce the notion of the structural template.
Definition 11. If φ ∈ FormLPA , we say that φ̂ is its structural template iff
• No constant symbol occurs in φ̂.
• No free variable occurs in φ̂ twice.
• For every term t occurring in φ̂, if all variables in t are free, then t is a
free variable.
• No variable occurs in φ̂ both as a bounded and as a free variable.
• The formula φ can be obtained from φ̂ by renaming boundedvariables
and substituting terms for free variables in such away that no variable
appearing in those terms becomes bounded.
• φ̂ is the smallest formula with those properties.
We say that formulae φ,ψ are structurally similar, φ ∼ ψ iff φ̂ = ψ̂.
Example 12. If φ = ∀x∃x∀z (x+S0)× (((y×S0)+ 0)+ (y+ z)) = (z× (x+
S0)) × Sy, then
φ̂ = ∀w1∃w1∀w2 (w1 + v0)× (v1 + (v2 + w2)) = (w2 × (w1 + v3))× v4,
where wi, vi are chosen so as to minimise the formula.
Example 13. 1. The formulae φ1 = ∃x∀xx+y = 0 and φ2 = ∃y∀y y+x =
z × SSS0 are structurally similar.
2. The formulae ψ1 = ∃x∀y x + y = 0 and ψ2 = ∃y∀y x + y = 0 are
not structurally similar, because the first quantifies over two distinct
variables and the second does not.
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3. The formulae η1 = ∃x∀y x + y = 0 and η2 = ∃x∀y x + y = y are not
structurally similar because in the first one, the universally quantified
variable occurs only once under the scope of the quantifier.
By induction on the complexity of formulae, one can easily check that
any formula has its structural template. By minimality, it is unique. Now,
we are able to define our desired notion.
Definition 14. Let φ,ψ be two sentences. We say that they are structurally
equivalent iff they are structurally similar and there exist two formulae
φ∗, ψ∗ which differ from φ̂ by renaming bounded variables, and sequences
s¯, t¯ of closed terms such that s¯◦ = t¯◦ (i.e., all the terms in the sequence have
the same values) for which φ = φ∗(t¯) and ψ = ψ∗(s¯).
We denote this relation with φ ≈ ψ.
Example 15. Suppose that φ = ∃x x + S0 = 0 + S0 and ψ = ∃y y + (S0 +
0)× S0 = S0. Then φ ≈ ψ.
Definition 16. By the structural regularity principle (SRP) we mean the
following axiom:
∀φ,ψ ∈ SentLPA
(
φ ≈ ψ → Tφ ≡ Tψ
)
.
In what follows, we will essentially work with the theory CT− + SRP.
One of the fundamental results in the theory of truth states that CT−, the
theory of compositional truth predicate, does not prove any new arithmeti-
cal theorems:
Theorem 17 (Kotlarski–Krajewski–Lachlan). CT− is conservative over PA.
On the other hand, as proved in [18], the presence of CT− has nontrivial
consequences on the model-theoretic side.
Theorem 18 (Lachlan). If (M,T ) |= CT−, then M is recursively saturated.
Moreover, the same holds for CT−↾[0, c] for every nonstandard c ∈M .
By a simple compactness argument, using arithmetical partial truth pred-
icates (say, for Σn classes, as every formula in Σn has depth ≤ n), one can
show that the theory of the restricted compositional truth predicate is still
conservative also when we consider the fully inductive variant.
Theorem 19. The theory saying "I is a nonstandard initial segment and CT↾I"
is conservative over PA.
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Recall that CT↾I is simply a theory of truth predicate which satisfies
full induction and compositional conditions for formulae whose depth is in
an unspecified initial segment I . The obvious common strengthening of
the two theories, i.e. CT, is much stronger than PA. For example, arguing
by induction on the length of proofs, we can easily see that CT proves the
consistency of PA.
Theorem 20. CT is not conservative over PA.
More generally, using essentially the same proof, we can show the fol-
lowing
Theorem 21. If (M,T ) |= CT↾[0, c], then every proof of contradiction of PA in
M contains a formula of depth > c.
Interestingly, we can conservatively add to CT− some specific form of
the induction scheme. By internal inductionwe mean the axiom:
∀φ ∈ Form≤1
LPA
(
Tφ(0) ∧ ∀x (Tφ(x)→ Tφ(x+ 1))→ ∀xTφ(x)
)
. (INT)
It essentially states that any set defined with a (possibly nonstandard) for-
mula under the truth predicate satisfies the induction scheme. As we have
already mentioned, the following holds:5
Theorem 22 (Kotlarski-Krajewski-Lachlan). CT− + INT is conservative over
PA.
The same result holds if we consider a theory CT− + INT + SRP. We
will not show it, but we will discuss the proof in the Appendix, since it is a
slight modification of the proof of Lemma 29.
Theorem 23. CT− + SRP+ INT is conservative over PA.
3 The main result
In this section, we will prove our main theorem. As we have written in the
introduction, Richard Kaye askedwhether CT− with full collection scheme,
but without any induction, is conservative over PA. We provide a partial
5The result is announced, but not really proved, in [16] and [6]. A complete proof occurs
in [19].
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answer to this question. Let us consider the scheme of local collection,
LocColl, which consists of the following formulae:
∀c
(
∀x < a∃y φ[Tc/T ](x, y)→ ∃b∀x < a∃y < b φ[Tc/T ](x, y)
)
,
where φ is an arbitrary formula ofLPA extendedwith a truth predicate and
Tc(x) abbreviates T (x)∧dp(x) ≤ c. Local collection expresses that any such
restriction of the truth predicate, Tc, satisfies full collection scheme.
Theorem 24. CT− + LocColl is conservative over PA.
The proof of the main result relies on the following simple and well-
known observation.
Proposition 25. LetM |= PA be a κ-like model for some regular cardinal κ. Let
T ⊂M . Then (M,T ) satisfies full collection scheme.
Proof. For any function f : M → M and any a ∈ M , the image of the
initial segment f [[0, a]] has less then κ elements and thus it is bounded. This
immediately implies that the collection scheme holds inM expanded with
an arbitrary predicate.
The observation suggests one possible strategy of the proof that collec-
tion for the truth predicate is conservative over PA. If up to elementary
equivalence, for any countable M |= PA, we can find an ω1-like elemen-
tary end-extensionM ′ with a truth predicate T , then this predicate T must
automatically satisfy the collection scheme, which in turn implies that col-
lection is conservative over PA.6 Basing on this approach, we are able to
show conservativity of local collection.
We shall rely heavily on the construction of the disintegration of a truth
predicate. To better understand it, observe that in the arithmetical context,
the truth predicate canonically determines a satisfaction relation ST (x, y)
via the definition:
ST (φ, α) := FormLPA(φ) ∧Asn(α, φ) ∧ T (φ[α]).
Then, the disintegration of a truth predicate is simply an infinite family of
projections of ST along the singleton sets {φ}, for each formula φ in the
considered model.
6This strategy of proofwas explicitly suggestedby RichardKaye. However, aswe already
mentioned, the most obvious strategy of building ω1-like models of CT
− simply does not
work, due to the fact that not every model of CT− has an end-extension.
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Definition 26. Let (M,T,X) |= CT−↾X. The disintegration of T is a family
of predicates {XTφ}φ∈M which are interpreted in (M,T,X) by the condition
α ∈ XTφ iff Asn(α, φ) ∧ T (φ[α]).
The idea of disintegration is that we expand M with all relations (pos-
sibly of nonstandard arity) which are arithmetically definable with possi-
bly nonstandard formulae using the predicate T . Let us notice that this
newly obtained structure corresponds to the original one in a very direct
way. Namely, the following equivalence holds for any η ∈ FormLPA(M):
(M,T,XTφ)φ∈M |= ∀α ∈ Asn(η) XTη(α) ≡ Tη[α].
Let us proceed to the lemma which is the technical core of our proof.
Note that, in view of Theorem 21, already here a dramatic difference from
the induction scheme becomes apparent. In what follows, we will denote
the elementary diagram of a modelM by ElDiag(M).
Lemma27. For anyM |= PA and any c ∈M , the theory ElDiag(M)+CT−↾[0, c]+
Coll is consistent.
Recall that CT−↾[0, c] is the theory of a compositional truth predicate for
formulae of depth at most c.
Since, we will need to use the above lemma iteratively, we will need
its strengthening which is proved in almost the same way, so we will only
present the proof of the following version:
Lemma 28. LetM |= PA be a countable recursively saturated model and let c < d
be any two elements. Suppose that (M,T ) |= CT−↾[0, c] + Coll + SRP is recur-
sively saturated in the expanded language. Then there exists T ′ ⊃ T such that
(M,T ′) |= CT−↾[0, d] + Coll+ SRP.
In [6], the conservativity of CT− has been demonstrated with an ele-
gant, model-theoretic reasoning. The proof presented there allows numer-
ous modifications in order to obtain finer results. We will make use of one
such strengthening. We will use it in the proof of Lemma 28.
Lemma 29. Suppose that (M,T, I) |= CT−↾I+Coll+SRP is a countable model
recursively saturated in the extended language with I an initial segment, possibly
empty. Then there exists T ′ ⊃ T such that (M,T ′) |= CT− + SRP and, more-
over, the model (M,T,XT ′φ)φ∈M satisfies full collection scheme, where the family
{XT ′φ}φ∈M is the disintegration of T
′.
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Notice that the crucial point of the above lemma is that the predicates
Xφ satisfy collection jointly with the original predicate T .
The lemma is proved by combining a resplendence argument and the
Enayat–Visser construction. The details are standard and are given in the
Appendix. We now turn to the proof of Lemma 28.
Proof of Lemma 28. Let (M,T ), c, d be as in the assumption. Using Lemma
29, we construct a model (M,T ∗) |= CT− + SRP such that T ∗ ⊃ T and the
predicates {XT ∗φ}φ∈M satisfy full collection jointly with T .
We will show thatM has an elementary end extensionM ′ such that for
some T ′ ⊆M ′ extending T ∗, (M ′, T ′) |= CT−↾M+Coll+SRP. In particular,
it follows that for any c ∈M ,
(M ′, T ′) |= ElDiag(M) + CT−↾[0, c] + Coll+ SRP.
By resplendence, this will conclude the proof. (Note that T ′ which we con-
struct in the proof is not literally the same as T ′ satisfying the conclusion of
the lemma, but we would like to avoid employing excessively heavy nota-
tion.)
Since (M,T,XT ∗φ)φ∈M satisfies full collection scheme, by Keisler’s The-
orem 9, it has an elementary end extension. By taking an ω1-chain of such
elementary end-extensions,we obtain amodel (M ′,X ′T ∗φ)φ∈M elementarily
extending (M,XT ∗φ)φ∈M , whereM
′ is an ω1-like model.
Now, let
T ′0 =
{
φ(t1, . . . , te) ∈ SentLPA(M
′) | φ ∈ FormLPA(M), 〈t1, . . . , te〉 ∈ ClTermSeqLPA(M
′),
(M ′,X ′T ∗φ)φ∈M |= XT ∗φ(〈t1
◦, . . . , te
◦〉)
}
,
where we conflate a sequence of values and a corresponding assignment.
Notice that we do not assume that the sequence 〈t1
◦, . . . , te
◦〉 has standard
length or standard values. Let finally:
T ′ =
{
φ ∈ SentLPA(M
′) | ∃ψ ∈ FormLPA(M)∃〈t1, . . . , te〉 ∈ ClTermSeqLPA(M
′)
ψ ≈ φ(t1, . . . , te)
}
.
We claim that (M ′, T ′) |= CT−↾M +Coll+ INT+SRP. This model satis-
fies collection scheme by Proposition 25, sinceM ′ is ω1-like. Notice that T
′
0
was defined only for sentences obtained by substituting terms into formu-
lae from M , whereas we want to make sure that it is defined on formulae
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whose depth is in M . However, since M ′ is an end-extension of M for any
formula whose depth is inM , its syntactic template is inM as well.
We first check that the compositional conditions are satisfied for T ′ and
the sentences φ(t1, . . . , te) for φ ∈ FormLPA(M) by cases which depend on
the syntactic shapeof a formulaφ. For example, letφ(t1, . . . , te) = ∃vψ(v, t1, . . . , te)
where ψ ∈ FormLPA(M) and 〈t1, . . . , te〉 ∈M
′. The equivalence
∀α ∈ Asn(φ)
(
XT ∗φ(α) ≡ ∃β ∼v α XT ∗ψ(β)
)
holds in (M,XT ∗φ)φ∈M , since T
∗ satisfies compositional conditions. There-
fore it must hold in (M ′,X ′T ∗φ)φ∈M by elementarity. So by definition T
′ sat-
isfies the compositional condition for the quantifier for the formula φ. The
other cases are analogous.
The compositional conditions are satisfied for other sentenceswith depth
inM as well. Take any formula φ ∈M ′ such that dp(φ) ∈M . First observe
that if φ ∼ ψ and ψ ∈ M , then φ̂ ∈ M , since by elementarity ψ̂ ∈ M and
these two are equal. Then we check that T ′ is compositional by case distinc-
tion depending on the main connective or quantifier in φ.
For instance, suppose that φ = ∃vη, T ′φ holds, and φ ≈ ψ = (∃wξ) ∈M
such that T ′ψ holds. Then by compositionality of T ′0, there exists x ∈ M
′
such that T ′ξ(x) holds. Now, since η(x) ≈ ξ(x), by definition T ′η(x) holds
aswell. An analogous reasoning shows that ifT ′η(x)holds for somex ∈M ′,
then T ′φ holds. The argument for disjunction is similar.
The argument for negation is the only place where we use SRP. Namely,
suppose that T ′¬φ holds for some φ ∈ M ′. We want to show that T ′φ does
not hold. Suppose otherwise. By definition of T ′, there exists ψ ≈ φ such
that ψ = ψ∗(t1, . . . , tn) for some ψ
∗ ∈ FormLPA(M) and T
′
0¬ψ holds. By
compositionality, T ′0ψ does not hold. Now, by SRP T
′
0η cannot hold for any
η ≈ ψ. In particular, it cannot hold for any η ≈ φ. The other implication
for the compositionality of negation can be proved with a simple argument
similar to the argument for the existential quantifier.
It follows immediately by the construction that T ′ satisfies the structural
regularity property SRP.
Now, we are ready to prove our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 24. Let M |= PA be any countable recursively saturated
model. Fix any sequence (an)n∈ω cofinal in M . Using Lemma 27 in the
initial step and Lemma 28 and chronic resplendence in the induction step,
we construct a sequence of predicates Tn such that
(M,Tn) |= CT
−↾[0, an] + Coll,
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the constructedmodels are recursively saturated in the expanded language.
Finally, we set T :=
⋃
n∈ω Tn. Then we readily check that (M,T ) |=
CT− + LocColl. SinceM was arbitrary, this concludes the proof.
4 Local induction
As we have already noted, the behaviour of local collection is in stark con-
trast to the behaviour of local induction which is its natural analogue for
the induction scheme. More precisely, let us define the instances of local
induction, LocInd, as follows:
∀c
(
φ[Tc/T ](0) ∧ ∀x
(
φ[Tc/T ](x)→ φ[Tc/T ](x+ 1)
)
→ ∀xφ[Tc/T ](x)
)
,
where φ is an arbitrary formula in the language LPA extended with a truth
predicate and Tc(x) is an abbreviation for T (x)∧dp(x) ≤ c. In other words,
(M,T ) |= CT− + LocInd iff ∀c ∈M, (M,Tc) |= CT↾[0, c], (LocInd)
so local induction scheme expresses that any restricted truth predicate Tc
satisfies full induction.
One can easily observe that local induction is not conservative over PA,
since it proves the consistencyof PA. Indeed, by composing Theorem21 and
the above condition (LocInd) one gets that for every c ∈ M , every proof of
0 = 1 in PA contains a formula of complexity > c. Let us briefly recall the
whole argument: take any proof d in PA, say, in Hilbert calculus. There ex-
ists c such that all sentences occurring in that proof have complexity smaller
than c. Take the restricted predicate Tc and show, using local induction, that
every sentence in that proof is true. Consequently, the conclusion of the
proof has to be true, and thus it cannot be of the form "0 6= 0."
The above proof essentially shows that in CT− + LocInd, we can show
the following principle of global reflection:
∀φ ∈ SentLPA PrPA(φ)→ Tφ, (GR)
where PrPA(x) is the canonical provability predicate for PA. In order to
prove global reflection, we fix any φ which is provable in PA, we fix any
proof of φ and take any b such that all formulae in the proof have depth
smaller than b. Then we take the restriction Tb and show by induction on
the length of derivation that all formulae in the proof are true under all
assignments.
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As shown by Kotlarski in [15], CT− with global reflection proves ∆0-
induction for the truth predicate. His argument was later refined in two
ways by Cezary Cieśliński: firstly, in [2] it was shown that reflection over
first order logic (i.e. (GR) with PrPA changed to Pr∅) is sufficient to prove
∆0 induction. Secondly, in [1] it was shown that the closure under proposi-
tional logic principle, i.e. the sentence
∀φ PrTProp(φ)→ T (φ),
where PrTProp(φ) expresses that φ is provable from true premises in pure
propositional calculus, is enough to yield bounded induction.7
Kotlarski in [15] characterised the arithmetical strength of global reflec-
tion in terms of the following family of theories:
Th0 = PA
Thn+1 = {∀xφ(x) | φ(x) ∈ LPA,∀k ∈ ω Thn ⊢ φ(k)}
Theorem 30 (Kotlarski). CT− + (GR) is arithmetically conservative over PA+
{Con(Thn) | n ∈ ω}.
An easy argument shows that the above arithmetical theory is equiva-
lent toω-many iterations of the uniform reflection principle over PA. Details
concerning the inclusion of Kotlarski’s theory in the iterations of reflection
can be found in the paper [23] and in the second author’s PhD Thesis, [7].
It turns out that the content of LocInd can be characterised in a very
precise manner. We have just shown that it implies global reflection GR. It
turns out that LocInd is exactly equivalent to GR.
Fact 31. CT− + LocInd is equivalent to CT−+ GR.
Moreover, it was shown in the second author’s PhD thesis [7] that CT−+
GR is equivalent to CT0, the compositional truth theory CT
− extendedwith
bounded induction for the full language which immediately allows us to
obtain an equivalent characterisation.
Fact 32. CT− + LocInd is equivalent to CT0.
7We note, however, that the last principle expresses closure of the set of true sentences
under a logical reasoning. Thus we potentially require somethingmore than in the previous
two reflection principles.
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It is relatively straightforward to show that CT−+ GR proves internal
induction, INT. Let ind(φ) abbreviate the axiom of induction for a formula
φ ∈ Form≤1
LPA
, i.e. the sentence
φ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
φ(x)→ φ(x+ 1)
)
→ ∀xφ(x).
We work in CT−+ GR. Since for every φ ∈ Form≤1
LPA
we have PrPA(ind(φ)),
by GR it follows that T (ind(φ)) holds. By compositional axioms and exten-
sionality we obtain the sentence
T (φ(0)) ∧ ∀x
(
T (φ(x))→ T (φ(x+ 1))
)
→ ∀xT (φ(x)).
It is a classical fact of first-order arithmetic that there exist partial Σn-
truth predicates. More precisely, the following holds provably in PA:8
Theorem 33. For every n, there exists a formula Trn such that for every sentence
φ with dp(φ) ≤ n (in fact, for φ ∈ Σn), the following equivalence holds:
Trn(φ) ≡ φ.
This theorem formalises in PA, hence we have:
∀c∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ c→ PrPA(Trc(φ) ≡ φ)
)
.
By GR and the compositional axioms we obtain:
∀c∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ c→ (TTrc(φ) ≡ Tφ)
)
.
LetΘc(x) be defined as TTrc(x)∧x ∈ SentLPA ∧dp(x) ≤ c. Fix any instance
of the induction scheme containing the truth predicate Tc(x):
φ[Tc](0) ∧ ∀x
(
φ[Tc](x)→ φ[Tc](x+ 1)
)
→ ∀xφ[Tc](x).
Since Tc and Θc are equivalent by the above considerations, the displayed
sentence is equivalent to:
φ[Θc](0) ∧ ∀x
(
φ[Θc](x)→ φ[Θc](x+ 1)
)
→ ∀xφ[Θc](x).
But, by applying compositional axioms for the full truth predicate T , we can
"pull it up" from Θc to the top of the formula φ, thus obtaining:
Tφ[Tr′c](0) ∧ ∀x
(
Tφ[Tr′c](x)→ Tφ[Tr
′
c](x+ 1)
)
→ ∀xTφ[Tr′c](x),
where Tr′c(x) is the formula Trc(x) ∧ x ∈ SentLPA ∧ dp(x) ≤ c. The last
formula is however an instance of the internal induction axiom and thus is
provable in CT−+ GR. This shows that LocInd holds in CT−+ GR.
8For a detailed discussion of arithmetical truth predicates, see [9], Chapter I, Section 1(d),
pp.50–61.
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5 The strength of BΣn(T )
Let us now consider a question whether adding a little bit of collection to
CT0 increases the arithmetical strength of the latter theory. Let us denote
BΣn(T ) := CT0 +Σn-Coll,
where Σn-Coll is the restriction of full collection scheme to Σn formulae in
the expanded language. It is easy to observe that, as in the purely arithmeti-
cal setting, we have
BΣn+1(T ) ⊢ CTn,
andCTn+1 ⊢ Con(CTn), hence alreadyBΣ2(T ) is arithmetically non-conservative
over CT0. What is left is the case of Σ1 collection: we shall show that it is
Π2-conservative over CT0 (over the full language with the truth predicate),
which implies that BΣ1(T ) is arithmetically conservative over CT0 as for
every arithmetical sentence φ, T (φ) is an atomic sentence of the expanded
language equivalent to φ (provably in CT−). More generally, the situation
for fragments of CT parallels the one well known from fragments of PA:
Theorem 34. For every n ≥ 0, BΣn+1(T ) is Πn+2 conservative over CTn in the
extended language. In particular for all n, BΣn+1(T ) is arithmetically conservative
over CTn.
Although the proof follows essentially by the same pattern of reasoning
as in the classical Paris–Friedmann result (see [9], Theorem 1.61, Chapter IV
or [11], Corollary 10.9), one detail has to be taken care of. It is the content
of the following lemma. Let us recall that if we have a modelM and a set
I ⊆M , then
supM (I) := {x ∈M | ∃b ∈ I M |= x < b} .
IfM is a model of PA− and I is closed undermultiplication, then supM (I) is
a substructure ofM . If additionallyM |= CT−, then we can naturally view
supM (I) as a substructure ofM .
Lemma 35. Suppose M  N are models of CT0. Then supN (M) |= CT
−. Con-
sequently, supN (M) |= CT0.
Proof. The only problematic issue is whether supN (M) satisfies the compo-
sitional axiom for the existential quantification, i.e.
∀φ ∈ Form≤1PA
(
FV(φ) ⊆ {v} → T∃vφ ≡ ∃x Tφ(x)
)
,
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Fix φ and v as above and put I = supN (M). Given that I ⊆ N , the non-
obvious part iswhether I validates the implication T∃vφ→ ∃xTφ(x). Work-
ing in I , assume T (∃vφ). Let d ∈ M be greater than ∃vφ (as an element of
N ). Consider the following sentence
∃c∀v < d∀ψ < d
((
Var(v) ∧ Form≤1
LPA
(ψ) ∧ T∃vψ
)
→ ∃x < c Tψ(x)
)
.
The above is true inM , since it is equivalent to
∃c∀v < d∀ψ < d
((
Var(v) ∧ Form≤1
LPA
(ψ) ∧ Td+1∃vψ
)
→ ∃x < c Td+1ψ(x)
)
which is an instance of the strong collection scheme for Td+1 and each re-
striction of T is fully inductive by LocIndwhich is equivalent to CT0 by Fact
32. Fix c ∈M witnessing the existential quantifier. By elementarity
∀v < d∀ψ < d
((
Var(v) ∧ Form≤1
LPA
(ψ) ∧ T∃vψ
)
→ ∃x < c Tψ(x)
)
is true in N , but as it is a ∆0(T ) sentence with parameters from I , it holds
in the latter model as well (by definition I ⊆e N ). This ends the proof since
dmajorizes both v and φ in supN (M).
The rest of the proof of Theorem 34 can be carried out as in the case of
arithmetical theories. We will use the following lemma as the key ingredi-
ent.
Lemma 36. Let I n N be twomodels in a language extendingLPA, possibly with
additional predicates, where n ∈ N (we allow n = 0). If N satisfies Σn-induction,
then I satisfies Σn+1-collection.
The proof of this fact for the language of arithmetic is given e.g. in
[11], Proposition 10.5. It transfers to languages extending LPA after obvi-
ous modifications.
Proof of Theorem 34. In order to prove the theorem, it is enough to show that
if φ ∈ Σn+2 is satisfied in some model of CTn, then it is satisfied in some
model of BΣn+1(T ).
So fix a modelM |= CTn + φ, where φ = ∃x∀yψ(x, y), ψ ∈ Σn. LetN be
an elementary extension ofM such that supN (M) 6= N . Put I = supN (M).
By elementarity, there exists c ∈M such that
N |= ∀yψ(c, y),
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Ifψ(x, y) is∆0, then it automatically follows that the same is true in I , which,
by Lemma 35 is a model of CT0 and thus by Lemma 36, a model of BΣ1(T ).
This concludes the proof for n = 0.
For greater n’s we have to show that I ≺n N . This will conclude our
argument since then again we obtain that I |= ∀yψ(c, y) by elementarity
and that I |= BΣn+1(T ) by Lemmata 35 and 36.
We show Σn-elementarity: employing the Tarski–Vaught test, it is suffi-
cient to show that for all θ(x, y) ∈ Σn and all b ∈ I
N |= ∃xθ(x, b)⇒ ∃d ∈ I N |= θ(d, b).
So fix θ(x, y) ∈ Σn, b ∈ I and assume N |= ∃xθ(x, b). Fix e ∈ M such that
N |= b < e. SinceM |= CTn we have an f such that
M |= ∀y < e
(
∃xθ(x, y)→ ∃x < f θ(x, y)
)
,
hence the same is true in N by elementarity. It follows that for some d,
N |= θ(d, b) ∧ d < f . Any such dmust belong to supN (M)which concludes
the proof. It follows that supN (M) is a Σn elementary initial segment of
N |= CTn. This concludes the proof.
Kotlarski and Ratajczyk, in [17], gave a characterisation of arithmetical
consequences of CTn in terms of the transfinite induction. For each k ∈ N
define (below, αβ denotes ordinal exponentiation):
ω0(k) = k
ωm+1(k) = ω
ωm(k).
Assume a standard coding of ordinals below φ2(0) (see e.g. [8]) and denote
by TI(α, φ) the transfinite induction for φ up to α, the formula
∀β
(
∀γ ≺ βφ(γ)→ φ(β)
)
−→ ∀γ ≺ αφ(γ).
Theorem 37 (Kotlarski, Ratajczyk, [17]). For every n, the sets of arithmetical
consequences of CTn and PA+
{
TI(εωn(k), φ) | φ ∈ LPA, k ∈ N
}
coincide.
Corollary 38. For every n, the sets of arithmetical consequences ofBΣn+1(T ) and
PA+
{
TI(εωn(k), φ) | φ ∈ LPA, k ∈ N
}
coincide.
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6 End-extensions of models of CT−
One obvious strategy to show that CT−+Coll is conservative over PAwould
be to show that any countable model of CT− has a countable end-extension
and thus build an ω1-chain of models of CT
−. However, in general this
strategy is doomed to fail, as witnessed by the following result of Smith
([22], Theorem 4.3).
Theorem 39 (Smith). There exists a countable model of CT− which has no end-
extension.
Sketch of a proof. Take a model (M,T ) |= CT− in which there is a formula
φ such that
{
〈x, y〉 ∈M2 | (M,T ) |= Tφ(x, y)
}
is a bijection fromM to its
proper initial segment [0, a]. (It can be shown that such a predicate T exists
by a modification of Enayat–Visser argument. A more complete argument
can be found in the paper [22] of Smith.)
Now, all the following sentences are in T :
1. ∀x, y
(
φ(x, y)→ y < a
)
.
2. ∀x1, x2, y
(
φ(x1, y) ∧ φ(x2, y)→ x1 = x2
)
.
3. ∀x, y1, y2
(
φ(x, y1) ∧ φ(x, y2)→ y1 = y2
)
.
4. ∀x∃yφ(x, y).
Therefore, if (M,T ) has an end-extension (N,T ′), then all the above sen-
tences will be in T ′. This means that in (N,T ′), the formula φ defines a
bijection from N to [0, a]. However, this is impossible, since all elements in
[0, a] are already values of elements fromM under this bijection.
In the light of the above result, once could hope to find some extension
Θ of CT− such that:
1. Θ is conservative over PA.
2. Any countable model from Θ has an end-extension to a model of Θ.
3. Θ is closed under taking unions of end-extensions.
Our initial hope was that CT− + INT may fit the bill. Note that the lack of
internal induction (or, in fact, of internal collection) is exactly the obstruc-
tion which makes it impossible for a model introduced by Smith to have
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an end-extension. Unfortunately, we did not manage to settle the question
whether any countable model (M,T ) |= CT− + INT has an end-extension
to a model of CT− + INT. However, we managed to obtain the following
partial result:
Theorem 40. If (M,T ) |= CT− + INT + SRP is a countable model recursively
saturated in the extended language, then there exists an end extension (N,T ′) |=
CT− + INT+ SRP which is also recursively saturated in the extended language.
Before we proceed to the proof, we need one more lemma:
Lemma 41. Let (M,T, I) |= CT−↾I + SRP + INT be any countable model re-
cursively saturated in the expanded language. Then there exists T ′ ⊃ T such that
(M,T ) |= CT− + SRP+ INT.
The lemma is proved by using resplendence and a slight modification
of the Enayat–Visser argument. We will briefly discuss its proof in the Ap-
pendix.
Proof of Theorem 40. Let (M,T ) |= CT− + INT + SRP be countable and re-
cursively saturated. As in the proof of Lemma 27, letXTφ, φ ∈ FormLPA(M)
be the disintegration of T . The model (M,XTφ)φ∈M satisfies full induction
scheme, so it has an elementary end extension to a model (N,X ′Tφ)φ∈M . As
in the proof of Lemma 28, from the predicatesX ′φ, we can obtain a predicate
T ′ such that (N,T ′) |= CT−↾M + INT+ SRP. (One can check with a direct
elementarity argument that the construction preserves INT.) In particular,
N is recursively saturated. Observe that even if (N,X ′Tφ)φ∈M is recursively
saturated in the expanded language (it can taken to be so), (N,T ′) need not
be, hence Lemma 41 neednot apply. However, by a resplendence argument,
we can show that we can find (N ′, T ′′) so that:
• The model (N ′,M, T, T ′′) is recursively saturated.
• M ≺e N
′.
• T ⊂ T ′′.
• (N ′, T ′′,M) |= CT−↾M + INT+ SRP.
• (M,T ) |= CT.
More precisely, by Paris–Friedman Theorem 7, M and N are isomorphic.
Therefore, in N there is a predicate T ∗ such that (N,T ∗) ≃ (M,T ). Let f be
an isomorphism between these models. The structure (N,T ∗,M, T, f, T ′)
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witnesses that the following theory is consistent with ElDiag(N,T ∗) using
additional predicates I, TI , g, T˜ :
• I is an elementary initial segment of N .
• g : (N,T ∗)→ (I, TI) is an isomorphism.
• (N, T˜ ) |= CT−↾I + INT+ SRP.
• T˜ ⊃ TI .
In order to see that the theory is consistent, identify I withM , TI with T , g
with f , and T˜ with T ′. By resplendence, it can be realised by interpreting
I, TI , g, T˜ as relations in N in such a way that the obtained model is recur-
sively saturated. Since (I, TI) is isomorphic with (M,T ), the latter model
has an end extension (N ′, T ′′)with the desired properties.
We could hope that we could build ω1-like models of CT
− by taking
chains of recursively saturated models of CT− + INT. Unfortunately, there
is a serious obstruction to this strategy: a union of recursively saturated
models need not be recursively saturated and at this point we do not see a
clear strategy to circumvent this problem.
Another possible strategy which one could consider is to show that if
M e N and T ⊂ T
′ such that (M,T ) |= CT− + INT, (N,T ′) |= CT−↾M +
INT, then T ′ can be extended to a predicate T ′′ ⊃ T ′ such that (N,T ′′) |=
CT− + INT. I.e., one could hope that we can get rid of the resplendence
argument in the above proof. However, we unfortunately know that this
is in general impossible without further assumptions. Indeed, there exist
countable modelsM,N and predicates T, T ′ such that:
• M e N .
• (M,T ) |= CT− + SRP+ INT.
• (N,T ′) |= CT−↾M + SRP+ INT.
• T ⊂ T ′,
in which T ′ cannot be further extended to a predicate T ′′ satisfying CT−.
The proof of this fact will appear in [14].
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Let us make one last remark: the example given by Smith shows how
a model can fail to have an end-extension because of how its truth predi-
cate looks like and it has nothing to do with the structure of the underly-
ing arithmetical model. However, quite surprisingly if (M,T ) is a model of
CT−, possibly uncountable, then M has an elementary end-extension to a
model N which then can be expanded to a model of CT−. This has been
observed by Albert Visser.9 In the proof, we use the following result, orig-
inally proved essentially in [20]. A (hopefully more perspicuous) proof of
this exact statement will appear in [14].10
Theorem 42. Let (M,T ) |= CT−. Then there exists a T ′ and a nonstandard
c ∈M such that (M,T ′) |= CT↾[0, c].
Theorem 43 (Visser). Suppose that (M,T ) |= CT−. Then there exists an ele-
mentary end-extension M e N and a T
′ such that (N,T ′) |= CT−.
Sketch of a proof. Let (M,T0) |= CT
− and let (M,T ) |= CT↾[0, c] with c non-
standard which exists by Theorem 42.
Consider the LPA ∪ {T}-definable set Θ containing the compositional
axioms of CT− and all arithmetical sentences φ, possibly nonstandard, such
that φ ∈ T . Within PA, we can formalise the Enayat–Visser conservativity
proof for CT− over PA and show that Θ is consistent. More precisely, for
every n, (the straightforward arithmetisation of) the following assertion is
provable in PA (see [4], Lemma 4.3 which is formulated for the language of
arithmetic but generalises to other theories with full induction extending
PA):11
(∗) IfK |= I∆0 + exp is any∆n model, then there exists a∆n+1 model
(N,T ′) |= Th and K is an LPA-elementary submodel of N .
where Th denotes the compositional axioms for the truth predicate from
CT−. Using cut-elimination one checks that (the set of sentences satisfying)
T is consistent and then applies (∗) to a∆2 definable modelK of T (viewed
as a set of sentences). We can fix (N,T ′) given by the above claim.
9The original argument was slightly different, since it did not use the results of [4]. We
are grateful for his permission to include here the proof of this unpublished result.
10Actually, in order to prove the result below, we only need to have a predicate T ′ which
satisfies uniform Tarski biconditionals for standard formulae and full induction scheme for
the extended language. This is exactly what Theorem 4.1 in [20] gives us. However, we
wanted to use a formulation more in line with the notation of this paper.
11Different approaches to the formalisation of the conservativity of CT− within PA were
presented in [19] and [6].
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Such (N,T ′) satisfies CT−, N is an end-extension of M and for every
standard formulaφ(x1, . . . , xn) and elementsa1, . . . , an ∈M ,N |= φ(a1, . . . , an)
iff (M,T ) |= Tφ(a1, . . . , an) iff M |= φ(a1, . . . , an). This guarantees that
M  N which concludes the proof.12
Note that in the above theorem, we do not make any assumptions on
the cardinality of M . For countable models, the theorem may be proved
in a much easier way, since by Lachlan’s Theorem [18], for every model
(M,T ) |= CT−, the underlying arithmetical model M is recursively sat-
urated. By a theorem of Friedman, every countable recursively saturated
modelM has an elementary end extension to another suchmodelN .13 This
model, in turn, can be expanded to a model of CT− by resplendence of
countable recursively saturated models, since CT− is conservative over PA
by Theorem 17.
7 Appendix
In this article, wemade use of some facts which relied onmodification of the
Enayat–Visser proof. The required changes are rather straightforward, and
therefore we moved the proofs to the Appendix. We tried to make the pre-
sentation reasonably self-contained, but the reader might want to consult
the original paper [6].
Let us beginwith a proof of Lemma 29. We restate it for the convenience
of the reader.
Lemma 44. Suppose that (M,T, I) |= CT−↾I+Coll+SRP is a countable model
recursively saturated in the extended language with I an initial segment, possibly
empty. Then there exists T ′ ⊃ T such that (M,T ′) |= CT− + SRP and, more-
over, the model (M,T,XT ′φ)φ∈M satisfies full collection scheme, where the family
{XT ′φ}φ∈M is the disintegration of T
′.
Proof. Let (M,T, I) |= CT−↾I + Coll+ SRP. We will find an extension:
(M,T, I) ⊂ (M∗, T ∗, I∗, T ′)
such that
12More information onArithmetisedCompleteness and the fact that innermodels inmod-
els of PA give rise to end-extensions may be found in [11], Section 13.2.
13This can be seen as follows: by resplendence, M has an initial segment I  M such
that I is also recursively saturated. By Paris–Friedman Theorem 7, I ≃ M . Since M is
isomorphic to I and I has an elementary recursively saturated end-extension, the same is
true forM .
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1. (M,T, I)  (M∗, T ∗, I∗) is an elementary extension,
2. (M∗, T ′) |= CT− + SRP,
3. T ∗ ⊆ T ′ and
4. for every φ1, . . . , φn ∈ FormLPA(M
∗), the predicates XT ′φi satisfy full
collection jointly with T ∗.
Since (M,T, I) is resplendent, this will conclude our proof. Note that the
predicatesXT ′φ are not present in the language, but point 4 in the above list
can be expressed in terms of the predicate T ′ alone by quantifying univer-
sally over the formulae φ1, . . . , φn. (Which is important, since otherwise the
resplendence argument would not be valid.)
We will construct an ω-chain of models (Mj , Tj , Ij ,X
j
φ, Sj)φ∈Mj−1 using
auxiliary predicatesXjφ such that for any k, the chain {(Mj , Tj , Ij ,X
j
φ)}j≥k,φ∈Mk−1
is elementary. Finally, we will set
⋃
Mj = M
∗,
⋃
Ij = I
∗,
⋃
Tj = T
∗.
The predicates Sj will be satisfaction predicates compositional for formu-
lae from the modelMj−1 if j > 0. Finally, we will set:
T ′ = {φ ∈ SentLPA(M
∗) | ∃j φ ∈ SentLPA(Mj) ∧ (φ, ∅) ∈ Sj+1} .
At the initial step, we setM0 = M, I0 = I, T0 = T
′
0 = T . By convention
M−1 = ∅. At each step,we inductively take (Mj+1, Tj+1, Ij+1,X
j+1
φ , Sj+1)φ∈Mj
to be the model of the theory Θj expanded with extra predicate consisting
of the following axioms:
• ElDiag(Mj , Tj , Ij,X
j
φ)φ∈Mj−1 .
• (Compositional axioms) Comp(φ), for φ ∈ FormLPA(Mj) which state
that Sj+1 behaves compositionally with respect to φ. Shortly, we will
give a more precise definition.
• (T ′ contains T ) ∀xTj+1(x)→ Sj+1(x, ∅).
• (The sequence Sj stabilises) Sj+1(φ, α), where φ ∈ Mj−1 and (φ, α) ∈
Sj .
• (The definition of Xj+1φ ) X
j+1
φ (α) ≡ α ∈ Asn(φ) ∧ Sj+1(φ, α), φ ∈
FormLPA(Mj).
• All the instances of the collection scheme in the language with arith-
metical symbols and the predicatesTj+1,X
j+1
φ , whereφ ∈ FormLPA(Mj).
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• (ExtensionalityAxiom)∀φ ∈ FormLPA∀α ∈ Asn(φ)Sj+1(φ, α) ≡ Sj+1(φ[α], ∅).
• (Structural Regularity Axiom) ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentLPA
(
φ ≈ ψ → Sj+1(φ, ∅) ≡
Sj+1(ψ, ∅)
)
.
Recall that the structural equivalence relation φ ≈ ψwas introduced in Def-
inition 14. Notice one important (but admittedly subtle) difference between
this formulation and the original proof of [6]. In the original version, Enayat
and Visser required that the constructed chain be elementary only in the
signature of the base language. Here, we additionally require elementar-
ity with respect to the predicates Xjφ. . Let us explain a bit what actually
happens.
In the j-th step, we introduce a predicate Sj+1 which is compositional
for the formulae from the current modelMj . Together with this model, we
introduce a family of predicates Xj+1φ which are the disintegration of the
predicate Sj+1, but defined only for formulae in the current modelMj . No-
tice that by elementarity, we actually require that Tj+1 behaves like Tj , Ij+1
behaves like Ij , and crucially,X
j+1
φ behaves likeX
j
φ whenever φ ∈Mj−1. In
other words: we really do require more regularity that in the usual Enayat–
Visser construction. For instance, if φ(v) ∈ FormLPA(Mj) has only one free
variable, and x is the smallest element satisfying φ under Sj+1, (the smallest
element such that Sj+1(φ, α) holds, where α(v) = x), then by elementar-
ity requirement forXj+1φ , x will stay the smallest such element throughout
the whole construction. On the other hand, in the original construction of
Enayat–Visser, we essentially only require that Sj+1(φ, α) still holds in the
later stages. This is enough to guarantee that the compositional conditions
hold in the final model, but would not suffice to guarantee that the disinte-
gration of the final model satisfies full collection. To this end, we need some
elementarity, and we introduce the predicates Xjφ to conveniently describe
what amount of elementarity is needed. One last remark for the scrupulous
reader: from the strict reading of our notation, it follows that there are lots
of predicates Xjc , where c is not a formula. We keep them, as we do not
want to overload our notation, but they are harmless to the construction.
The compositional axioms Comp(φ) are defined as the conjunction of
the following formulae:
• ∀s, t ∈ TermLPA∀α ∈ Asn(φ)
(
φ = (s = t) →
(
Sj+1(s = t, α) ≡ s
α =
tα
))
.
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• ∀ψ ∈ FormLPA∀α ∈ Asn(φ)
(
φ = ¬ψ →
(
Sj+1(φ, α) ≡ ¬Sj+1(ψ,α)
))
.
• ∀ψ, η ∈ FormLPA∀α ∈ Asnφ
(
φ = ψ ∨ η →
(
Sj+1(φ, α) ≡ Sj+1(ψ,α) ∨
Sj+1(η, α)
))
.
• ∀ψ ∈ FormLPA∀v ∈ Var∀α ∈ Asn(φ)
(
φ = (∃vψ) →
(
Sj+1(φ, α) ≡
∃β ∼v αSj+1(ψ, β)
))
.
Note that we officially work in a language without conjunction or universal
quantifiers. This choice is simply for convenience and does not affect our
results.
By direct and simple verification, we check that if our construction can
be performed, the resultingmodel (M∗, T ∗, I∗, T ′) satisfies our requirements,
i.e.:
• (M∗, T ∗, I∗) |= ElDiag(M,T, I).
• (M,T ′) |= CT−.
• T ∗ ⊆ T ′.
• Full collection scheme holds for the arithmetical language expanded
with the predicates T ∗,XT ′φ, where φ ∈ FormLPA(M
∗) (where T ′φ are
the disintegration of T ′).
In order to verify the last item, notice that every such collection axiom con-
tains only finitely many predicates XT ′φ. A model with finitely many such
predicates is a union of the elementary chain ofmodels containing the pred-
icates Xjφ. In our construction, we guaranteed that collection scheme holds
for the arithmetical language expanded with finitely many such predicates
and the predicatesTj corresponding to T
∗. Therefore, full collection scheme
holds by elementarity.
So the only thing which we need to check is whether our construction
can indeed be performed. In other words, we need to verify whether the
theories Θj can be inductively shown to be consistent. This will be proved
in a separate lemma.
Lemma 45. All theories Θj defined in the above proof of Lemma 29 are consistent.
In order to deal with the regularity axioms in the following proof, it will
be handy to have some extra notation. Let φ,ψ ∈ FormLPA , α ∈ Asn(φ), β ∈
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Asn(ψ). We say that (φ, α), (ψ, β) are structurally equivalent iff φ[α] ≈ ψ[β],
i.e., the sentences φ[α] and ψ[β] are structurally equivalent. We will also
denote this relation (φ, α) ≈ (ψ, β). Recall that we introduced this notion in
Definition 16. Recall that we call φ and ψ structurally similar iff they have
the same template φ̂ (see Definition 11.) If φ and ψ differ only by renaming
bounded variables without making any free variable bounded, we say that
φ and ψ are α-similar and denote it with φ ≃ ψ. We are extremely sorry for
the amount of notation we need to introduce which has deceptively similar
meaning. After these preliminary remarks, we can proceed to the proof.
Proof of Lemma 45. In the proof we assume that j > 0. The case j = 0 is
handled in a similar fashion with a slightly simpler argument. Fix a model
(Mj , Tj , Ij , Sj ,X
j
φ)φ∈Mj−1 |= Θj . We will argue by compactness that the
theoryΘj+1 defined using this model is consistent. (The model determines
the theory Θj+1 via its elementary diagram.)
Fix any finite Θ ⊂ Θj+1. There are only finitely many φ ∈ FormLPA(Mj)
either occurring under the predicate Sj+1 or as an index of the predicate
Xj+1φ . Let us enumerate these formulae as φ1, . . . , φn. It is enough to find
an interpretation of the predicate Sj+1 in the model (Mj , Tj , Ij) such that:
• Tj ⊂ Sj+1.
• Sj+1 respects regularity axioms.
• Sj+1 respects compositional conditions on formulae φ1, . . . , φn.
• Sj+1 together with Tj satisfies full collection scheme.
• Sj+1(φ, α) ≡ Sj(φ, α) holds whenever φ ∈ Mj−1 and φ is among
φ1, . . . , φn.
Notice that the last item guarantees both that stabilisation condition and
elementarity for the language with the predicatesXφ hold.
Consider the equivalence classes [φi]∼ of φ1, . . . , φn. Consider the fol-
lowing relation⊳0: [φ]⊳0 [ψ] iff there exist φ
′ ∈ [φ] and ψ′ ∈ [ψ] such that φ′
is a direct subformula of ψ′. One can check that E, the transitive closure of
⊳0, is a partial order on classes (since it is a transitive closure of some binary
relation, it is enough to check that no loops can occur, which is obvious).
We define the predicate Sj+1 by induction on E. If [φ] is minimal with
respect to this ordering, we consider two cases: either [φ]∩Mj−1 = ∅ or not.
If the former holds, we set:
∀ψ ∈ [φ]∀α ∈ Asn(ψ) ¬Sj+1(ψ,α).
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Thus φ defines an empty set under the satisfaction predicate. In the latter
case, since [φ] ∩Mj−1 is nonempty, and the template φ̂ is definable with a
parameter inMj−1, it must also be inMj−1 by elementarity. Notice that for
any ψ ∈ [φ], there exists s¯ ∈ TermSeq
LPA
such that ψ ≃ φ̂(s¯). Now, for any
α ∈ Asn(φ), ψ[α] is also an element of [φ], so there exists the unique t¯ such
that ψ[α] ≃ φ̂(t¯) and, consequently, there is (the unique) β ∈ Asn(φ̂) such
that ψ[α] ≈ φ̂[β] (namely, β equal to the sequence of values t¯◦). We set:
Sj+1(ψ,α) ≡ Sj(φ̂, β).
Finally, if φ ∼ φi for some i ≤ n and [φ] is not minimal in the ordering
E, we inductively define the behaviour of Sj+1 so that the compositional
conditions are satisfied. For instance, if φ = ∃vψ, we set
Sj+1(φ, α) ≡ ∃β ∼v αSj+1(ψ, β).
We add to Sj+1 all pairs (φ, α) such that φ ∈ FormLPA(Mj), α ∈ Asn(φ), and
Tj(φ[α]) holds. Having defined Sj+1, we setX
j+1
φ (α) ≡ X
j
φ(α) for φ ∈Mj−1
and define the sets Xj+1φ so as the definition-axiom of X
j+1
φ is satisfied for
φ ∈Mj \Mj−1.
We have to check that our requirements are satisfied. Let us notice that
Sj+1 satisfies full collection scheme, since it is arithmetically definable in
the predicates Tj andX
j
φ, where φ ∈Mj−1 ∩{φ̂1, . . . , φ̂n}. These predicates
satisfy jointly full collection by assumption. This means that Xj+1φ for φ ∈
Mj defined using Sj+1 also satisfy collection.
Since by induction hypothesis Sj satisfied regularity and composition-
ality axioms, we check that Sj+1 agrees with Sj on formulae from Mj−1.
Hence the defined structure satisfies ElDiag(Mj , Tj , Ij ,X
j
φ)φ∈Θ′ whereΘ
′ is
the finite set of φ such that Xφ occurred in the analysed finite theory Θ.
The obtained structure satisfies compositional axioms, since regularity
and compositionality was satisfied on Sj by induction hypothesis and on Tj
by elementarity and the assumption that T satisfies CT−↾I + SRP. Compo-
sitional axioms are satisfied on formulae which are not structurally similar
to the ones inMj−1 directly by our construction.
Finally, we check that the regularity axioms are satisfied. We prove this
by induction on the order E. If [φ] is minimal and [φ] ∩ Mj−1 6= ∅, then
structural regularity and extensionality conditions follow by the induction
hypothesis onSj and the definition of Sj+1. These properties followdirectly
by definition for the minimal [φ] such that [φ] ∩Mj−1 is empty. If [φ] is not
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minimal, then we check that they are preserved by extending Sj+1 compo-
sitionally. This is very simple for the negation and disjunction case, so let
us check that they preserved in the step for the existential quantifier.
Suppose that Sj+1 satisfies structural regularity and extensionality for
formulae in [ψ]. Let φ = ∃vψ.
In order to verify the extensionality condition, we want to check that
Sj+1(φ, α) holds iff Sj+1(φ[α], ∅) holds. By compositionality and the induc-
tion hypothesis, we have the following equivalences:
Sj+1(φ, α) ≡ ∃β ∼v α Sj+1(ψ, β)
≡ ∃β ∼v α Sj+1(ψ[β], ∅)
≡ ∃x Sj+1(ψ[α], {〈v, x〉})
≡ Sj+1(φ[α], ∅).
Notice that {〈v, x〉} is an assignmentwhich sends v tox, soSj+1(ψ[α], {〈v, x〉})
makes sense. Observe that ψ[α] is a formula with only one free variable v,
the rest of free variables in ψ being filled out by the numerals α(w).
We verify structural regularity in a similar manner. Let us assume that
φ ≈ φ′ and that φ = ∃vψ. Then φ′ = ∃wψ′ and there exist sequences t¯, s¯ ∈
ClTermSeq
LPA
(Mj)with the same values such that
φ ≃ φ̂(t¯), φ′ ≃ φ̂(s¯).
Suppose that Sj+1(φ, ∅) holds. By symmetry, it is enough to show that
Sj+1(φ
′, ∅) holds as well.
Since Sj+1(φ, ∅) holds, by compositionality there exists α ∼v ∅ such that
Sj+1(ψ,α) holds (where α is an assignment with the domain either equal
to {v} or empty). By extensionality, Sj+1(ψ[α], ∅) holds. Let β be an assign-
ment such that β(w) = α(v). It is enough to show that ψ[α] ≈ ψ′[β], since
then Sj+1(φ
′, ∅) follows by structural regularity and compositionality.
Let us check that ψ[α] ≈ ψ′[β]. Let α(v) = β(w) = c. Let t¯′ = t¯ ⌢
〈c〉, s¯′ = s¯ ⌢ 〈c〉. There exists a variable u and a formula η such that φ̂ = ∃uη
and both ψ̂ and ψ̂′ are equal to η̂. We see that ψ[α] ≃ η(t¯′) and ψ′[β] ≃
η(s¯′) where s¯′ and t¯′ have the same values. On the other hand, there exist
sequences of terms s¯′′ and t¯′′ with the same values such that η(t¯′) ≃ η̂(t¯′′)
and η(s′) ≃ η̂(s¯′′). Since η̂ = ψ̂ = ψ̂′, by definition of structural equivalence
this implies ψ[α] ≈ ψ′[β] thus concluding the proof of Lemma 45.
Let us notice that in the above proof, collection was preserved, since the
interpretations of Sj+1 for finitely many new formulae were arithmetically
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defined in finitely many predicatesXφ and Tj . We could run a very similar
argument in order to obtain a truth predicate satisfying internal induction
INT, assuming that it was satisfied by our initial T , thus proving Lemma
41 and Theorem 23. Since the argument in that case is essentially the same
with no non-trivial modifications required, we omit it.
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